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CHECK ONE AND THE ACCOUNTABILITY IS DONE: THE
HARMFUL IMPACT OF STRAIGHT-TICKET VOTING ON
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
Meryl Chertoff* & Dustin F. Robinson**
INTRODUCTION
States that elect judges are heir to a populist tradition dating
back to the Jacksonian era. In the spectrum between independence
and accountability, these states emphasize accountability. Systems
vary from state to state, and even within states there may be
geographic diversity or different selection systems for different
levels of courts.
Elections can be partisan or non-partisan,
contested, or, as in merit-selection states, retention. Some states
have dabbled in public financing of judicial elections. Reformers are
most critical of contested partisan elections. Those are the elections
where the most money is spent, the nastiest ads aired, and the
dignity of the judicial office most often impugned. One factor that
often goes unnoticed, perhaps because of its unquestioned status in
a partisan election, is the ballot itself.
Critics of partisan judicial elections decry the very concept of
attaching a party label to a judicial candidate.1 The argument
certainly has its merits. However, even if a voter blindly checks the
box for every Democrat (for example) on the ballot, at least he has to
confront the name and notice that the candidate is running for a
judgeship. Some sort of internal evaluation—perhaps memory
recall of campaign literature or radio advertisements—remotely
* Meryl Chertoff is Director, The Justice and Society Program, The Aspen Institute, and
Adjunct Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center.
** Dustin F. Robinson is a graduate of Georgetown University Law Center, J.D. 2012.
This paper grows out of work done in a 2010 seminar on state court judicial selection.
Thanks to Bert Brandenburg of Justice at Stake, Professor Chertoff‘s co-instructor for that
course; to Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor for inspiring the decision to teach the seminar; and to
the Justice and Society Program and the Aspen Institute for supporting the preparation of
this article. Special thanks to Michael Green, Justice and Society Program Manager, and
troubleshooter extraordinaire.
1 See, e.g., Editorial, Firing Judges, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2010, at A20, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/04/AR2010110407646.html.
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informs the choice. Nevertheless, in a few states, the voter need not
even do that; he literally need only check a single box and be out of
the voting booth in thirty seconds or less. Straight-ticket voting2
virtually nullifies the legitimacy of judicial selection in partisan
election states. The low informational nature of these races makes
straight-ticket voting attractive to the uninformed voter. Parties in
states that allow the practice seize the opportunity to take
advantage of the uninformed voter and urge the single checkmark.
If the logic of an elected judiciary is that it is more accountable to
the public it serves, then straight-ticket voting directly contravenes
that goal by placing all the power in the selection process in the
hands of party leaders. Not only are minority party candidates
handicapped in such a system, so are majority party candidates who
fail to win the favor of party leadership. Judicial candidates and
judges are indebted to leadership for their patronage and
nomination, despite the fact that the judiciary does not align with
conventional party platforms.
Ultimately, uninformed voting
translates to facile voting, and influence translates to control. The
judges who win in straight ticket races are likely neither
accountable to the people nor independent of the party that elevated
them.
At present, sixteen states‘ ballots have a straight ticket option.3
Of those, three select their judges through partisan elections and
require that their judges participate in regular general elections,
not retention elections: Alabama, Texas, and West Virginia.4 As
such, these three are the states in which voters are most likely to
rely on straight-party voting in casting their votes in judicial
elections.
Texas stands as a prime example of a state where politics, and
particularly straight-ticket voting, has long had a visible influence
in the election of judges. As the current Chief Justice, Wallace
Jefferson, observed in connection with his own election:
My success depended primarily on a straight-ticket partisan
vote. . . . Even if I had never appeared in court, lost every
endorsement and fared poorly in polls that assess

2 Straight-ticket voting is understood here as literally the single party box check rather
than checking every member of a given party on the ballot, which is downright deliberative in
comparison.
3 Straight-Ticket Voting, NAT‘L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org
/default.aspx?tabid=16597 (last updated June 2, 2011).
4 Methods of Judicial Selection, AM. JUDICATURE SOC‘Y, http://www.judicialselection.us/
judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm?state= (last visited June 9, 2012).
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qualifications, I would still have won in Texas. The state
voted for McCain, and I was the down-ballot beneficiary.
Currently, merit matters little in judicial elections. We close
our eyes and vote for judges based on party affiliation even
though a party label does not ensure a judiciary committed
to the rule of law.5
Former Chief Justice, Tom Phillips, echoed the point:
Most of us [judges] feel like judges should not run as
Republicans or Democrats, which . . . in my opinion has been
a terrible blow for the stability of our judiciary. As the state
has changed from one party to the other over the last decade,
over 200 of our state trial and appellate judges have been
defeated in general elections. In almost every case for no
other reason that I can identify other than they were
running on the party that was not popular.6
While no case has reached the U.S. Supreme Court questioning
Texas‘ straight-ticket voting system for its judges, it may not be an
accident that the high court‘s two most recent relevant cases
involved West Virginia, which has a straight-ticket option on its
ballot, and New York, where although there is no straight-ticket
option, voter behavior is typically lock-step in voting straight party
line (downstate, Democratic, and upstate, Republican).
In the pages that follow, we examine straight-ticket voting, the
particularly pernicious role it plays with respect to voter choice, and
its impact on both judicial independence and accountability. We
then consider the probable outcome of a constitutional challenge to
Texas straight-ticket voting—we think it would likely fail—and
suggest two partial ways out of the thicket, one legislative and one
administrative.
I. THE EFFECT OF STRAIGHT-TICKET VOTING ON INDEPENDENCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
Independence and accountability are the central competing ideals
in judicial selection; both qualities are fundamental to a judiciary‘s
legitimacy. A state‘s decision to elect its judiciary necessarily

5 Wallace B. Jefferson, Op-Ed., Making Merit Matter By Adopting New System of Selecting
Judges (Mar. 21, 2009), HOUS. CHRONICLE, http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/
article/Wallace-B-Jefferson-Make-merit-matter-by-1544078.php.
6 Interview
with
Tom
Phillips,
WMHT:
JUSTICE
FOR
SALE
(2009),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/justice/interviews/phillips.html (last visited
Apr. 23, 2012).
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prioritizes accountability above independence, but some semblance
of the latter must remain for the sake of judicial integrity. The
electoral context, particularly the partisan variety, automatically
ushers in politics. The influence and financial strength of the major
parties and complementary interest groups have irrevocably shaped
the tone and substance of judicial elections around the country. The
dominance of parties is exaggerated in states where straight ticket
voting is an option, and judicial independence suffers. Additionally,
and contrary to the intent of judicial elections, straight-ticket voting
renders meaningful judicial accountability highly unlikely.
A. Party Influence and Judicial Independence
Political parties and partisan interests have moved steadily into
the judicial election field as judicial independence gradually erodes.
There is evidence to suggest that parties are overtly nationalizing
state-level judicial elections. Though still in a nascent stage, the
Democratic Judicial Campaign Committee, formed in 2007, has an
explicitly partisan goal: elect Democratic judges to state courts.7 No
corresponding Republican effort currently exists, but this may be
due to the lack of a need for one, given the funding ability and
staunchly Republican allegiances of the various chambers of
commerce throughout the country (the U.S. Chamber and its Ohio
affiliates spent $4.4 million in 2000, while the U.S. Chamber and
the Illinois Republican Party teamed up to spend $1.9 million in
2004).8
To be sure, political parties are very interested in state judicial
elections. The ramifications of the deep pockets of parties are
largest in states where partisan elections occur. From 2000 to 2009,
the Alabama Democratic Party spent just under $5.5 million on
judicial elections.9 The Illinois Democratic and Republican parties
were the top spenders in their state over the past decade ($3.7 and
$1.9 million, respectively).10 The Texas Democratic Party spent just
over $900,000 on television advertisements for the 2008 state
supreme court elections alone (though all three races were lost).11
Money equals power and, more often than not, money equals votes.

7 JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000–2009: DECADE OF
CHANGE 44–45 (2010).
8 Id. at 10.
9 Id. at 78.
10 Id. at 79.
11 Id. at 83.
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In judicial elections where a majority of the populace may not even
be aware the race exists, an expensive primetime television or other
media buy in a major market may make all the difference, and he or
she with the wealthier friends, or party bosses, can afford it.
With that power comes a chilling effect; whether or not their
actual decision-making is affected in individual cases, the specter
lingers in the popular imagination that judges decide cases the way
their political patrons want them decided, at the peril of their jobs.
This is the antithesis of judicial independence. While polling shows
that the threat to the integrity and impartiality of legal opinions
strikes a large number of Americans as repugnant and anathema to
the rule of law,12 voters in elected judge states are fairly likely to
hold their noses, especially in states where straight-ticket voting is
available. Party allegiance and convenience trump concerns over
judicial independence.13 Partisan dominance of every aspect of the
judicial selection process in those states with straight-ticket
voting14—from the hand picking of candidates to the dissemination
of propaganda—corrupts the idea of an independent judiciary, one
distinct from the chaos of partisan politics. The threat that
straight-ticket voting poses to institutional independence is both
particularly strong and insidious, as the judiciary becomes just
another partisan branch of government.
B. Party Influence and Judicial Accountability
At the opposite end of the spectrum of judicial values,
accountability was supposedly the impetus for judicial elections in
12 For example, seventy-eight percent of Minnesotans ―are ‗very‘ or ‗somewhat‘ concerned
that judicial candidates must raise more money, run television advertising, and potentially
seek party and political interest group support.‖ Poll of Minnesota Citizens, JUSTICE AT STAKE
CAMPAIGN, http://www.justiceatstake.org/resources/polls.cfm (last visited Apr. 23, 2012).
13 In contrast to Minnesota, polls have shown seventy percent of Texans favoring judicial
elections. Anthony Champagne & Kyle Cheek, The Cycle of Judicial Elections: Texas as a
Case Study, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 907, 935 n. 136 (2002). However, at one point, eightythree percent believed the elections should be nonpartisan. Janet Elliott, Ethics Rules
Revised for Candidates, HOUS. CHRONICLE, Oct. 23, 2002, at A34, available at
http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/Wallace-B-Jefferson-Make-merit-matter-by1544078.php. This tolerance for judicial elections may be a quirk unique to the United States
populace. While a few judicial elections do take place in Swiss cantons and some Japanese
judges stand for retention elections, the United States is unique in subjecting a significant
percentage of its judiciary to the electoral process.
14 It should be acknowledged that partisan dominance of judicial selection may not be
endemic to partisan election states; in those states where governors appoint judges to terms,
certainly party alliance between the judge and the executive could factor into the equation.
However, the politics are nowhere near as rampant and threatening to judicial independence
as they are in straight-ticket voting states.
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the first place.15 Yet straight-ticket voting wreaks havoc on judicial
independence, without concomitant gains in accountability.
Accountability is viable in a judicial selection system. While
merit selection states tend to give a nod to incumbents, recent years
have seen a number of instances in which state high court judges
lost their seats in retention elections and contested elections due to
one highly unpopular decision. For a recent and dramatic example
of drastic voter enforcement of judicial accountability, look to the
2010 Iowa Supreme Court retention election, where three state
supreme court justices lost their seat due to the unpopularity of a
single decision on same-sex marriage.16 While Iowa employs a
merit selection/retention system, not a partisan election system,
this example demonstrates the power that a coalition of well-funded
individuals can wield. In effect, such a coalition can buy an
election. The anti-retention forces in this race raised approximately
$650,000 to remove three justices who were part of a unanimous
decision finding that the Iowa constitution required the recognition
of gay marriage. Previously, no justice had failed a retention
election since the adoption of the merit selection system in 1962. In
the same year, a move to defeat Kansas Supreme Court justices who
had voted for an unpopular decision was narrowly beaten back, and
there have been similar episodes in Pennsylvania and Colorado.
Practices such as these raise their own set of problems—ones well
beyond the scope of this article. More edifying practices to increase
accountability include the incorporation of judicial performance
evaluations (―JPEs‖) to inform voters on whether to vote for or
against a sitting judge‘s retention.
Colorado‘s JPE program considers such criteria as courtroom
demeanor, efficiency on the bench, and rigorousness of appellate
decisions.17 As Rebecca Kourlis, a former chief justice of the
Colorado Supreme Court notes, the program has proven both
popular and effective. A television advertisement recently ran
encouraging voters to visit the evaluation committee‘s website,
where a voter could easily access information on a given judge. 18
15 Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why It Matters For
Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1259–60 (2008).
16 Grant Schulte, Iowans Dismiss Three Justices, DES MOINES REGISTER.COM, (Nov. 3,
2010), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/20101103/NEWS09/11030390/Iowans-dismis
s-three-justices.
17 INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., TRANSPARENT COURTHOUSE: A
BLUEPRINT FOR JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 8, 11, 13–15 (2006).
18 Judicial Performance Reviews, COLO. OFFICE OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION,
http://www.coloradojudicialperformance.gov/review.cfm (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
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Colorado judges are held accountable for their performance on the
bench through these informed evaluations; the electorate can
remove a judge for failure to abide by standards laid out by the
evaluation committee and reported on by those with firsthand
experience with the judge (litigants, courtroom staff, etc.).19 This
makes sense for a state that opts to prioritize accountability. Those
passing judgment on the judge, the voters, have the ability to
inform themselves as to whether a judge is good at his or her job.
Texas, Alabama, and West Virginia do not utilize an evaluation
system like Colorado‘s.20 There is little in the way of monitoring or
oversight of judicial performance at all. In Texas, in fact, political
party leadership urges the opposite of accountability during election
season. The Dallas County Democratic Party chairwoman urged
voters in the 2008 election to: ―vote D and you‘re done.‖21 A state
senator similarly informed voters: ―[o]ne and you‘re done.‖22 County
party chairpersons routinely rally the electorate around the idea of
casting only one vote.23
Party dominance of judicial elections in Texas remains strong. A
2008 Texas Democratic Party advertisement focused on the solely
Republican membership of the state‘s supreme court and
emphasized its perceived propensity to overturn jury rulings in
favor of big business and insurance interests.24 The ad concluded
INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 17, at 8, 11, 16–18.
See Methods of Judicial Selection Retention: Evaluation Programs, AM. JUDICATURE
SOC‘Y, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/judicial_performance_evalu
ations.cfm?state (last visited Apr. 6, 2012) (explaining that Texas, Alabama, and West
Virginia do not evaluate the performance of judges who are up for reelection while Colorado
has legislation which calls for midterm and retention year evaluations by the office of judicial
performance evaluation that specifies evaluation criteria). Aside from decentralized efforts,
such as those of the Dallas Bar Association, see Judicial Evaluation Poll, DALL. BAR ASS‘N,
http://www.dallasbar.org/general-election-polls (last visited Apr. 6, 2012) (offering judicial
evaluations of judicial evaluations during non-election years), or the League of Women Voters
of Alabama, see Alabama Elections, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF ALABAMA,
http://www.lwval.org/learn-vote/election2012/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2012) (providing election
information for voters of the primary elections), neither the judiciaries nor the state bar
associations of these states provide formalized evaluations of judges. Would a voter faced
with the Harris County (Houston, Texas) ballot opt to become educated on every one of the
seventy or so judges‘ evaluations? A later discussion of voter fatigue should indicate the
unlikelihood of such informed democracy when all one has to do, instead, is pick ―R‖ or ―D.‖
21 Gromer Jeffers, Jr., Parties Beg: Vote Straight Ticket North Texas Candidates’ Fates
Ride on Support of Base at Polls, DALL. MORN. NEWS, Oct. 22, 2008, at 2B.
22 Id.
23 Ironically, the mechanics of straight ticket voting have been abused for the sake of vote
invalidation: in 2008, there were rumors that Republican interests were subversively
encouraging voters to just check the Democratic box, but to be sure to check the box for
Barack Obama as well. See id. A Texas ballot is invalidated if a voter checks the straight
party option and then marks anything further.
24 MSHCINTERACTIVE, Fair and Balanced Supreme Court, YOUTUBE (Oct. 24, 2008),
19
20
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with a voiceover calling for ―fair and balanced courts‖ and then
listed the names of the three candidates. The visual text of the ad
read, ―Vote for Democrats.‖25 Though not explicitly condoned in the
advertisement, the implication was to vote a straight ticket. This
goal was made markedly easier by the ability of Texas voters to do
so with a single checkmark.
The straight party option, at least in Texas, has resulted in
county-wide sweeps, or flips, of lower court judges, with the flips
corresponding to the partisan mood of the general population. The
2010 judicial elections in Harris County (which encompasses
Houston) resulted in a ―straight ticket bonanza‖ for the Republican
party. The county‘s party chairman, citing the likely 70 judge
pickup for the party (a complete victory), called it ―fabulous.‖26
His Democratic counterpart lamented that though ―[the
Democrats] had a good slate of judges . . . . [t]hey got caught up in
the fact that there are so many judicial positions on the ballot that
it‘s virtually impossible for the average voter to know which ones
are deserving of support and which ones aren‘t.‖27 That chairman
likely was not saying the same thing in years prior: similar flips
happened in Harris County in 2008 and Dallas County in 2006, but
both in favor of Democrats.28 As Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson of
the Texas Supreme Court acknowledged, in Texas‘ electoral climate,
as long as the straight ticket option persists, Democratic judicial
candidates do not have realistic access to statewide positions and
Republicans are at a disadvantage in urban, lower court races
(though 2010‘s anti-Democratic mood apparently assuaged the
latter).29
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZK0ubaqo5RA&feature=player_embedded (citing David A.
Anderson, Judicial Tort Reform in Texas, 26 REV. LITIG. 1, 7–22 (2007)).
25 MSHCINTERACTIVE, supra note 24.
26 Brian Rogers, Straight-Ticket Vote Rules in Judicial Races, HOUS. CHRONICLE (Nov. 2,
2010), http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/7276263.html.
27 Id.
28 Such judicial flips not only represent the domination of party politics, but also the
sweeping out of experienced trial judges to make room for an incoming class made up largely
of judicial freshmen. The implications for the efficiency, authority, and integrity of the bench
are daunting. See generally Mike Tolson, Democratic Sweep Revives Debate on Election of
Judges, HOUS. CHRONICLE (Nov. 9, 2008), http://www.chron.com/default/article/Democraticsweep-revives-debate-on-election-of-1780514.php (discussing the Democratic flip in Harris
County where twenty-two of twenty-six Republican judicial incumbents lost their seats and
the learning curve faced by newly elected judges); Thomas Korosec, Democrats Turn Dallas
County a Shade of Blue, HOUS. CHRONICLE (Nov. 9, 2006), http://www.chron.com/
default/article/Democrats-turn-Dallas-County-a-shade-of-blue-1887588.php (reporting that
straight ticket voting resulted in the Democratic Party gaining forty-two judgeships, the
district attorney‘s office, and the county judge‘s seat).
29 See Wallace Jefferson, The State of the Judiciary in Texas, 72 TEX. BAR J. 287, 289
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From a judicial administration perspective, too, sweeps are a
disaster. They purge the bench of experienced judges and require
the courts to play catch-up in many respects as the new judges
acclimate to their roles.
Party ideology and factors generally recognized as making for a
―good‖ judge do not neatly align. Whether a judge or judicial
candidate is a Republican or Democrat does not speak to his or her
ability to manage a substantial trial docket, to exercise decorum on
the bench, or to author intelligent, reasoned opinions. Straight
ticket voting substitutes party identification for considered
evaluation and thus fails to serve accountability interests.
II. STRAIGHT TICKET VOTING: AN ARTIFICIAL CURE TO ROLL-OFF
SYNDROME
Ballot format has been consistently understood to impact voter
response and election results. To advocates of straight-ticket
voting, the greatest balloting evil is down-ballot ―roll-off.‖ ―Down
ballot‖ races, those races lower on the ballot and less salient to the
public, are particularly likely to suffer from a voter ―roll off‖ effect: a
voter will reach these races on the ballot, determine he or she does
not have the information necessary to make an informed decision,
and opt not to cast a vote.30 If a voter casts a vote in such races, it is
possible he or she may do so based on such arbitrary criteria as
gender or perceived ethnicity.31 Judicial races are particularly
likely to suffer from the two hallmarks of a down ballot race: a
spatial and an informational handicap.
A. Judicial Ballot Layout
The very spatial organization of a typical ballot ensures that
judicial races will receive fewer votes. Ballot position research has
determined that races found lower on the ballot are more
susceptible to roll off as a function of voter fatigue, as voters grow

(2009) (suggesting a merit system for choosing judges to remedy the problems of both
Democrats and Republicans).
30 See David Brockington, A Low Information Theory of Ballot Position Effect, 25 POL.
BEHAV. 1, 2 (2003); Melinda Gann Hall & Chris W. Bonneau, Mobilizing Interest: The Effects
of Money on Citizen Participation in State Supreme Court Elections, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 457,
459 (2008). Voter roll-off can top fifty percent depending on the state. Hall & Bonneau,
supra, at 459. Hall and Bonneau‘s paper notes the interaction between voter roll off and the
amount of money spent on a particular campaign. Id.
31 See Brockington, supra note 30, at 4.
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tired with checking off boxes or pulling levers.32 In those states
where judicial elections are conducted concordantly with the other
standard November elections, judgeships are relegated to a position
further down the ballot than national and other statewide offices,
such as governor, as well as offices ranging from comptroller to
railroad commissioner.33
Beyond that, the number of judicial elections on a given ballot
may be overwhelming. The 2010 ballot in Birmingham, Alabama
(Jefferson County) included twenty-four judicial races.34 The 2010
ballot in Houston, Texas (Harris County) included seventy-two
judicial races (ranging from state supreme court justices to county
probate judges).35 As Richard Murray, a political scientist at the
University of Houston noted, Harris County may have the longest
ballot in the entire country.36 Birmingham voters, let alone
Houston voters, face a daunting task when entering the voting
booth and the likelihood of voter fatigue increases proportionately.
B. Judicial Election Information
The notoriously low informational nature of judicial elections
represents the second hallmark of a down ballot race. Roll off is
more likely to occur when the ballot does not contain informational
cues.37
More often than not, voters know little, if anything, about a slate
of judicial candidates. A poll conducted in 2001 showed that
seventy-three percent of respondents had only some or a little
information about judicial candidates, while fourteen percent had
no information at all.38 If a judicial race attracts attention, that
attention is often solely a function of the tendency of the news

See id. at 2–3.
See
Election
2010:
Harris
County
Sample
Ballot,
CHRON.COM,
http://blogs.chron.com/election/2010/11/harris_county_sample_ballot.html (last visited Apr.
23, 2012) [hereinafter Harris County Sample Ballot] (featuring a sample ballot from the
General and Special Elections of Harris County on Nov. 2, 2010).
34 ALABAMAVOTES.GOV.,
http://alabamavotes.gov/downloads/election/2010/general/sample
ballots/Jefferson-2010-Sample.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Jefferson County
Sample Ballot].
35 See Harris County Sample Ballot, supra note 33.
36 See Alan Bernstein, Many Harris Voters Cut Long Ballot by Picking Straight Ticket,
HOUS. CHRONICLE (Oct. 23, 2008), http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/
6073645.html.
37 See Brockington, supra note 30, at 3–4.
38 Geyh, supra note 15, at 1270 (citing Greenberg, Quinlan, Rosner Research Inc., JUSTICE
AT
STAKE
FREQUENCY
QUESTIONNAIRE
4
(2001)
available
at,
http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/JASNationalSurveyResults_6F537F99272D4.pdf).
32
33
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media to create a ―horse race‖ narrative in partisan elections.39
Voters are thus left with little substantive information about the
judicial context. It is not unusual for a judicial campaign to receive
no more than two news stories in a newspaper covering the
election.40 Beyond the sheer dearth of information, judicial elections
are more difficult for the electorate to comprehend on a conceptual
level. The special nature of a judicial election offers few
opportunities to provide informational shortcuts or galvanizing
messages tailored to the judicial context: ―Vote for Stare Decisis!‖
does not make for good campaign paraphernalia.41
Voters attuned to judicial races are not likely to encounter
deliberative educational conversations about a race.42
The
substance of judicial elections, which theoretically should be
grounded in abstract legal considerations such as constitutional
philosophy and appellate practice, renders them more esoteric,
lacking a natural partisan foothold. While there are some readily
available partisan sound bites extolling or decrying originalism or
judicial activism,43 the number of talking points pales in comparison
to that for legislative and executive elections (where the content
may range from taxation to abortion, issues highly salient to
voters).44
C. The Straight Ticket “Cure”
Straight ticket voting provides a palliative for roll off, as indicated

39 David B. Rottman, Conduct and its Oversight in Judicial Elections: Can Friendly
Persuasion Outperform the Power to Regulate?, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1295, 1314 (2008)
(citing BRIAN F. SCHAFFNER & JENNIFER SEGAL DIASCRO, Judicial Elections in the News, in
RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 115, 121–24 (Mathew J. Streb ed. 2007) (assessing the number of articles covering
judicial elections and finding that in the period from 2000–2004, in states with contestable
judicial elections, on average, supreme court races attracted less than ten news articles, a
fourth of which were editorials and that most stories were not printed in the first section of
the newspaper)).
40 Id. at 1314 n.63.
41 David Pozen, Are Judicial Elections Democracy-Enhancing?, in WHAT‘S LAW GOT TO DO
WITH IT? WHAT JUDGES DO AND WHY IT MATTERS, 17 (Charles G. Geyh, ed., 2011).
42 Id.
43 Id. at 17–18.
44 But see Gay Marriage, Tax Fights Spark High-Profile Court Races,Justice at Stake &
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, http://www.justiceatstake.org/newsroom/press_releases.cfm/
gay_marriage_tax_fights_spark_highprofile_court_races?show=news&newsID=8857.
Colorado, Iowa, and Kansas experienced highly publicized judicial races in 2010, all in mere
retention elections (the three states employ the merit selection system), motivated,
respectively, by taxation issues, gay marriage, and abortion. The appropriateness of the
prominence of these issues in judicial selection is highly questionable.
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in much of the political science literature on the topic.45 Voters get
not only the informational cue of party affiliation, but also the ease
of checking a single box and being done. As Murray acknowledged,
straight ticket voting is ―certainly a time saver, if you‘re looking for
efficiency.‖46 Party cues typically provide a strong heuristic for
voters.47 In informational theory terms, party cues are considered
secondary information (information that can be gathered from a
cursory glance at the ballot); primary information refers to
information garnered from actual campaign or issue research.48
Party identification is widely understood to be one of the strongest
sources of political association, the method by which voters identify
themselves in the electoral context.49 Consequently, partisan races
in which candidates are identified as a Democrat or Republican (or,
hypothetically, Libertarian, Green, or any other party affiliation)
are less likely to suffer from diminished voter response.
The availability of straight ticket voting increases the total
number of ballots cast for all races in a given election. Down ballot
races, in particular, are more likely to receive a vote in states that
allow for straight ticket voting.50 In fact, two thirds of voters in
Harris County utilized the straight ticket function on their ballots
in the 2004 election, amounting to approximately seven hundred
thousand voters.51 By definition, those were seven hundred
thousand voters who effectively cast a vote in every judicial race in
the county.
On some level, this could be considered a boon for judicial
elections: participation grows exponentially and elections of judges
are seemingly legitimized. But how legitimate is a vote based upon
minimal information and reasoning? A general presumption exists
that, in states where judges are elected, accountability factors
heavily into judicial selection, but independence is not to be entirely

45 Brockington, supra note 30, at 2–3; Philip Dubois, Voter Turnout in State Judicial
Elections: An Analysis of the Tail on the Electoral Kite, 41 J. OF POLITICS 865, 876–83 (1979).
Dubois emphasizes the impact of the Indiana or ―party column‖ ballot, used by the states that
allow for straight ticket voting, and its tendency to drastically decrease voter roll off as
compared to states with other forms of partisan ballots and states with nonpartisan or
retention elections.
46 Bernstein, supra note 36.
47 Brockington, supra note 30, at 4.
48 Id.
49 See generally JAMES STIMSON, TIDES OF CONSENT: HOW PUBLIC OPINION SHAPES
AMERICAN POLITICS (2004); BENJAMIN PAGE & ROBERT SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY
YEARS OF TRENDS IN AMERICANS‘ PUBLIC POLICY PREFERENCES (1992).
50 Brockington, supra note 30, at 5 n.10.
51 Bernstein, supra note 36.
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eschewed. Can independence exist if judges in straight party ticket
states are essentially indebted to the political parties for their
ascension to and persistence on the bench?
Is there true
accountability when a voter does not even recognize the judge for
whom he or she votes?
Coordinated county campaigns, whatever salutary effect they
may have on the political branches, provide no information on the
judges selected by virtue of a single checkmark. To the winning
party, the results are ―fabulous,‖ regardless of how uninformed the
votes cast. The most charitable view is that party leaders believe it
is better to express some view on a candidate rather than none. A
less charitable explanation is that straight ticket voting
consolidates party control in the most durable branch of
government.
III. A SUPREME COURT CHALLENGE TO STRAIGHT TICKET VOTING
Given these two very different views of straight ticket voting,
would a constitutional challenge to Texas‘ straight ticket voting
have any chance of prevailing were it to reach the U.S. Supreme
Court?
The starting point for any analysis is the oft-cited leading case on
state judicial elections, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.52
The facts of White have often been recited. The Minnesota judicial
canons of ethics forbade a judicial candidate from discussing his or
her ―views on disputed legal and political issues‖ that might come
before the court to which he or she aspired.53 Finding the canon
violative of the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment, Justice
Scalia writing for the Court concluded that particularly in the
context of an election, state judicial campaign conduct committees
do not have the power to limit what a judicial candidate may
―announce‖ with regard to his or her views on matters that may
come before the court.54 Despite overtures to the importance of
impartiality, the majority concluded that, pragmatically speaking, it
would be ludicrous to think that judges do not have pre-formed
views on the topics that may come before them on the bench.55
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
Id. at 768.
54 Id. at 787–88.
55 Id. at 776–78. While it did hold that ―announce clauses‖ violated the First Amendment
rights of judicial candidates, the Court declined to consider the constitutionality of ―promise
clauses,‖ which forbid a judge from promising to bind himself or herself to a particular
outcome (effectively pre-judging a case). Id. at 770.
52
53
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In a concurring opinion, Justice O‘Connor questioned the wisdom
of contested judicial elections, although she did not go so far as to
question their constitutionality. Given the system Minnesota
employed, speech in these elections was critical, and so she voted
with the majority.56
Judicial candidates are therefore free to express their views on
most any matter, provided they do not pledge to decide one way or
another once on the bench.57 In practical effect, White has been less
a boon to the free speech of judicial challengers than a sword
wielded by interest groups. Judicial reticence to respond to
questionnaires from these groups, which often veer perilously close
to pledges as to how specific cases would be decided, was at one time
protected by canons like those in Minnesota. Post-White, the canons
cannot be used as a shield, and judges are often compelled to
answer questions they would prefer not to, on peril of losing key
endorsements.
If White stands for the proposition that speech by judicial
candidates has few limits, then the case of New York State Board of
Elections v. Lopez Torres58 stands for the proposition that insurgent
candidates can look only to speech to make their case for election;
they have no constitutional protection in securing a position on the
ballot in the face of a primary system that enforces political party
primacy. This 2008 case was a challenge to the New York
Democratic Party‘s control of primary elections for the state trial
court (in New York City victory in the Democratic primary is
virtually a guarantee of election).
Under New York‘s partisan election system, political parties
select a candidate through nominating conventions comprised of
delegates who have solicited the signatures of 500 party members.59
While parties that garnered at least 50,000 votes for their candidate

O‘Connor wrote:
Minnesota has chosen to select its judges through contested popular elections instead of
through an appointment system or a combined appointment and retention election
system along the lines of the Missouri Plan. In doing so the State has voluntarily taken
on the risks to judicial bias described above. As a result, the State‘s claim that it needs
to significantly restrict judges‘ speech in order to protect judicial impartiality is
particularly troubling. If the State has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely
one the State brought upon itself by continuing the practice of popularly electing judges.
Id. at 792 (O‘Connor, J., concurring). Subsequent to her retirement, Justice O‘Connor has
said that her deciding vote in the 5–4 White decision may be the one vote she regretted
having made while on the Court.
57 See id. at 819–21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
58 New York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008).
59 Id. at 200.
56
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in the most recent gubernatorial election automatically are entitled
to a spot on the ballot, independent candidates may acquire ballot
access only if they can solicit 3500–4000 signatures (depending on
the district in which they are seeking office).60
Lopez Torres, a Democratic Party insurgent judicial candidate,
complained that the system made it impossible for her to make the
inroads needed to garner a nomination.61 Writing for a unanimous
Court, Justice Scalia affirmed the constitutionality of the New York
system,62 rejecting the notion that ―one-party entrenchment‖ in a
given district could violate First Amendment associational rights;
indeed, the opposite result, he concluded, would violate those same
rights.63
In Justice Scalia‘s view, the availability of the petition process,
which provides a path to the ballot for minority candidates, albeit
without the blessing of majority party leadership, is enough to
ameliorate any constitutional concerns. Concerns about the wisdom
of the system, he counseled, were best resolved in the legislative
arena. As he said in the opinion‘s conclusion: ―New York State has
thrice . . . displayed a willingness to reconsider its method of
selecting Supreme Court Justices (the court‘s trial level). If it
wishes to return to the primary system that it discarded in 1921, it
is free to do so; but the First Amendment does not compel that.‖64
Though the Court‘s unanimous holding was primarily concerned
with partisan politics in general, the special implications for the
judicial context were reiterated in a separate concurrence by Justice
Anthony Kennedy. In remarks reminiscent of Justice O‘Connor‘s
concurrence in White,65 he expressed misgivings about the very idea
of judicial elections.66 However, he could not hold the given

Id. at 200–01.
Id. at 197.
62 Id. at 205–06 (―What constitutes a ‗fair shot‘ is a reasonable enough question for
legislative judgment . . . . [b]ut it is hardly a manageable constitutional question for judges—
especially for judges in our legal system, where traditional electoral practice gives no hint of
even the existence, much less the content, of a constitutional requirement for a ‗fair shot‘ at
party nomination. Party conventions, with their attendant ‗smoke-filled rooms‘ and
domination by party leaders, have long been an accepted manner of selecting party
candidates.‖).
63 Id. at 208 (―To our knowledge, outside of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment
contexts . . . no court has ever made ‗one-party entrenchment‘ a basis for interfering with the
candidate-selection processes of a party.‖) (citations omitted). The challenges based on other
amendments have primarily involved racial discrimination. For a discussion of such cases,
see California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 573 (2000).
64 Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. at 209.
65 White, 536 U.S. at 788–92 (O‘Connor, J., concurring).
66 Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. at 212 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (―When one considers that
60
61
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circumstances unconstitutional,67 not even in the face of party
control and manipulation.68 Kennedy did offer his view of how the
dangerous territory of judicial elections could be successfully
navigated:
In light of this longstanding practice and tradition in the
States [of electing judges], the appropriate practical response
is not to reject judicial elections outright but to find ways to
use elections to select judges with the highest qualifications.
A judicial election system presents the opportunity, indeed
the civic obligation, for voters and the community as a whole
to become engaged in the legal process. Judicial elections, if
fair and open, could be an essential forum for society to
discuss and define the attributes of judicial excellence and to
find ways to discern those qualities in the candidates.69
If judicial elections are ingrained in certain states‘ political
traditions, especially partisan elections, then efforts should
nevertheless be made to produce ―judicial excellence‖ from a
―societal forum.‖ For under the holding of Lopez Torres, party
entrenchment at varying levels is perfectly constitutional.70
Taken together, Lopez Torres and White suggest a system where
minority party candidates, or insurgent candidates of majority
parties, must rely on their ability to get their message across to
voters without the help of a party line endorsement. They can
speak; the question is, will anybody hear them?
The last case we will consider here delineates the outer limit—
that is, where the elected judge system goes so far that it does
violate constitutional norms. The most recent Supreme Court case
involving judicial elections, Caperton v. Massey,71 was a victory
against the unbridled politicization of judicial elections. Hugh
Caperton won a jury verdict of $50 million against the Massey Coal
Company immediately prior to the 2004 West Virginia judicial
elections.72 The chairman of Massey subsequently spent
elections require candidates to conduct campaigns and to raise funds in a system designed to
allow for competition among interest groups and political parties, the persisting question is
whether that process is consistent with the perception and the reality of judicial
independence and judicial excellence.‖).
67 Id. at 205–11 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that the ability of independent
candidates who are not party-sponsored to access the ballot through a separate signature
gathering process saves the constitutionality of the electoral system).
68 Id. at 212–13 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
69 Id. at 212 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
70 Id. at 208.
71 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
72 Id. at 872–73.
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approximately $3 million on the campaign of Brent Benjamin to
unseat one of the sitting justices; Benjamin won.73 Caperton sought
Justice Benjamin‘s recusal from the appeal of his case pursuant to
the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct, but Benjamin refused
and was part of the majority that overturned the jury‘s findings.74
West Virginia state judicial conduct codes, in addition to the
conference of state chief justices, require recusal whenever a
―judge‘s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.‖75 Caperton
again sought recusal of Benjamin for the rehearing; Benjamin
continued to refuse, even in the face of an opinion poll
demonstrating that 67% of West Virginians doubted his ability to be
impartial.76 After the overturning of his jury award was reaffirmed,
Caperton appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Court, in a 5–4 decision, concluded that ―the probability of
actual bias [rose] to an unconstitutional level‖ in this instance,
emphasizing the ―extreme‖ character of the facts and the
―extraordinary‖ nature of the situation.77 Justice Kennedy‘s
Caperton majority opinion focused on the plain ills of interested
parties‘ domination of judicial elections through monetary means.
Caperton is significant because it demonstrates that there are
some excesses in the partisan system of judicial elections that are so
extreme that due process norms are violated. Yet Lopez Torres
counsels that even extreme party domination of the ballot is not one
of them. Violations, if any, exist only to the extent that a judge
selected by a system where donation disparities are extreme may be
incapable of fairness in deciding the case of particular litigants. So
long as those extremes are not reached, candidates who have not
received the accolade of the majority party line for a judicial seat
have only their White-endorsed right of free speech to make their
case to the voters. In all three cases, members of the Court invited
the respective states to reconsider, in the legislative arena, the
policy choices they had made in the partisan election of judges.
Given this trilogy of cases, it appears that a challenge to Texasstyle straight ticket voting would have little chance to prevail before
the Court. As in Lopez Torres, minority candidates in Texas can
certainly appear on the ballot, and there is no impediment to their
speaking (although little chance they will be noticed). Nor is the
73
74
75
76
77

Id.
Id. at 873.
Id. at 888–90.
Id. at 874–75.
Id. at 888–90.
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sort of gross impropriety, or appearance of impropriety, created by
straight ticket voting alone sufficient to warrant a Caperton finding.
If New York‘s judicial primary system passes constitutional
muster, then unfortunately it appears that the ones in Texas,
Alabama, and West Virginia would too. But what about that
invitation by the Court to look at options for reform? Let‘s look at
the three states with straight ticket voting, and one more, New
York, post-Lopez Torres. Could the Court accomplish by invitation
what it refused to do by decision?
A. Alabama
In both the 1998 and 2006 cycles, campaign oversight committees
were established in Alabama, but the state has not shown a
commitment to long term reform of its partisan system.
B. New York
In 2006, as Lopez Torres was winding its way to the Supreme
Court,78 Chief Judge of New York Judith Kaye and the four
presiding justices of the appellate divisions, acting as the
Administrative Board of the Courts, adopted court rules
establishing a system of ―Independent Judicial Election
Qualification Commissions‖ (―IJEQCs‖) for New York State. The
IJEQCs in each state judicial district represented a nonpartisan
statewide screening process to review the experience and
qualifications of candidates for the courts of general jurisdiction in
New York.
The IJEQCs were one of the most important
recommendations of the Feerick Commission, a panel appointed by
Chief Judge Kaye to study the New York judicial election system
and recommend measures to promote public confidence in the
judicial election system.79
The IJEQCs have been used in New York since 2007. The
Commissions are designed to be independent of political influence
and include both lawyers and non-lawyers.80 The IJEQC is the
most significant reform in the New York judicial selection system
since the court moved to a merit selection system for its Court of
Lopez Torres v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 411 F.Supp. 2d 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
See COMMISSION TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, FINAL
REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (2006),
http://www.nycourts.gov/reports/FerrickJudicialElection.pdf
80 See Judicial Campaign Ethics Center, NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM,
www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/jcec/index.shtml (last visited June. 3, 2012).
78
79
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Appeals judges (the state‘s highest court) in 1977. Preliminary
assessments from court administrators in New York have been very
positive.81
C. Texas
The height of the judicial reform movement in Texas was
unrelated to straight-ticket voting, but was related to the amount of
money going into state appellate and supreme court races. In 1980,
Texas became the first state in which the cost of a judicial race
exceeded $1 million.
Between 1980 and 1986, campaign
contributions to candidates in contested appellate court races
increased by two hundred fifty percent. The 1988 supreme court
elections were the most expensive in Texas history, with twelve
candidates for six seats raising $12 million. Between 1992 and
1997, the seven winning candidates for the Texas Supreme Court
raised nearly $9.2 million dollars. Of this $9.2 million, more than
fourty was contributed by parties or lawyers with cases before the
court or by contributors linked to those parties.
To address the perceived impropriety of judges soliciting and
accepting large campaign contributions from attorneys and parties
who appear before them, the Texas legislature passed the Judicial
Campaign Fairness Act in 1995, and it was signed by then-Governor
Bush.
Texas has never adopted a judicial performance evaluation
system or any form of judicial screening program.
D. West Virginia
In reaction to the U.S. Supreme Court‘s holding in Caperton, then
Governor Joe Manchin designated an independent commission on
judicial reform, which released recommendations on November 15,
2009. The leading recommendations were for the state to adopt a
public financing pilot program for one of the two open supreme
court of appeals seats in the 2012 elections, and that has been

81 In particular, directors of the commissions in the Upstate regions have found
participation to be very high, roughly around 80%. And at least in the Albany region, it has
become common practice for a potential candidate to go through the qualification process
before seeking a party‘s nomination. Telephone Interview with Timothy O‘Keefe, Director,
Independent Judicial Election Qualification Commissions, Third Department (Dec. 28, 2011).
This suggests that the parties, regardless of how influential and powerful, are at least
embracing a criterion of legitimacy.
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done.82
Additional recommendations were codification of an
advisory commission procedure for selection of state supreme court
judges, for establishing an intermediate appellate court, and for
creating a business court.
No recommendations were made
regarding the partisan election system in West Virginia, and none
on ballot format.
IV. GOING FORWARD
It appears that the states invited by the Court to consider reform
in the decisions in Lopez-Torres and Caperton—New York and West
Virginia—have approached the task with varying degrees of
success. Nor have the straight ticket voting states considered
above—Texas, Alabama, and West Virginia—taken a cue from the
Court‘s decisions to re-examine the pernicious effects of partisan
elections on the independence and accountability of their own
courts. Is there no balm in Gilead? Chief Justice Jefferson noted,
―[s]o long as we cast straight ticket ballots for judges, the fate of all
judges is controlled by the whim of the political tide.‖83 Though the
most partisan individuals may disagree, that relationship cannot be
consistent with basic notions of judicial fairness and integrity.
Straight ticket voting may be a bad idea for politics generally, but it
is especially inadequate and unfit for the election of judges. We will
conclude by considering next steps in the battle for reform.
A. The Potential of Legislative Reform
The most likely source of reform is the state legislatures
themselves.
While straight ticket voting was at one time
widespread, efforts to scale back the availability of straight ticket
voting have been successful in a number of states. Illinois, for
instance, which also elects its judges, legislatively removed the
straight ticket option from its ballots in 1997.84 Chicago was at one
point the definition of a party machine city, a city entirely beholden
to Democrats who rejected attempts at good government reform; it
was also a city that could include up to seventy-two judges on its

82 Billy Corriher, West Virginia Rolls Out Public Financing for Judges, HARVARD L & POL‘Y
REV. BLOG (Apr. 19, 2012), http://hlpronline.com/2012/04/west-virginia-rolls-out-publicfinancing-for-judges/.
83 Jefferson, supra note 29, at 289.
84 Dirk Johnson, The 1998 Campaign: The Voting Booth; Straight-Ticket Voting Losing
Ease in Illinois, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/29/us/1998campaign-voting-booth-straight-ticket-voting-losing-ease-illinois.html.
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ballots for retention elections.85 While Chicago may remain a
largely Democratic stronghold, at the very least, the party has now
lost the ease of instructing voters to simply pull a single lever; as a
consequence, every name on the ballot must be confronted.
Convincing political parties to relinquish a mechanism that not
only guarantees a particularized set of votes but also an easy and
powerful method of campaigning is difficult, to say the least.
Illinois struck straight ticket voting when the Republicans had
control of the state‘s legislative assembly; the GOP uniformly
approved of the move and Democrats uniformly opposed.86 In
actuality, the Republicans did so as a dying gasp: They had just lost
control of the state house and passed the bill during a lame duck
session.87 The Democratic resistance was fierce; the battle made its
way through the Illinois court system, under the title Orr v.
Edgar.88 The Orr court refused to accept any of the plaintiff‘s
arguments, which ranged from the limitation of voter choice to the
particularized burden on the elderly (who would have to wait longer
and navigate more of a ballot).89 The measure stood and Illinois no
longer has the straight ticket option.90
Good government efforts across the country have similarly
targeted straight ticket voting in states where judges are not
elected.91 As to the states where elected judges are most impacted
by straight ticket voting, some legislative movement is underway in
Texas.92 A state senator is preparing to file a bill that would
eliminate the straight ticket option; he concludes that the option

Id.
David C. Kimball & Chris T. Owens, Where‘s the Party? Eliminating One-Punch Voting,
Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 1 (Apr. 29,
2000), available at http://www.umsl.edu/~kimballd/mpsa00.doc.
87 Rick Pearson, Court Delivers Ko to One-Punch Voting, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 7, 1998),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-10-07/news/9810070075_1_women-voters-illinoissupreme-court-straight-ticket-voting.
88 Orr v. Edgar, 698 N.E.2d 560 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
89 See id. at 564–66.
90 See id. at 566.
91 See, e.g., Jo Mannies, Clay Endorses Prop P, Reminds Dems No More Straight-Ticket
Voting, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 25, 2006), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govtand-politics/political-fix/article_7780f018-ca53-5078-8a44-b2696aa45e51.html.
Missouri,
which employs merit selection of its judges (also known as the Missouri Plan), ended the
availability of straight ticket voting in 2006. See Josh Goodman, Voting the Straight-Ticket
Sweep, GOVERNING: THE STATES AND LOCALITIES (June 2010), http://www.governing.com
/topics/politics/Voting-the-Straight-Ticket-Sweep.html; Judicial Selection in the States:
Missouri, AM. JUDICATURE SOC‘Y, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/i
ndex.cfm?state=MO (last visited June 3, 2012).
92 See Aman Batheja, Straight Ticket Votes Reach 10-Year High in Texas’ Largest Counties,
FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Nov. 9, 2010.
85
86
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―encourages less thoughtful voting.‖93 Unfortunately, the same
senator has filed similar bills in the past to no avail.94 Both parties
have expressed extreme resistance to the idea and consider the
proposition a proposed limitation on voter choice.95 While perhaps
the option to spend minimal to no time in the ballot booth, not a
second of which is truly deliberative, would be removed, it would, in
fact, be for the betterment of democracy and the judiciary. The
parties, unsurprisingly, fear any limitation on their power, and the
removal of the straight ticket option would be just such a limitation.
One opponent to the reform views voting as such: ―[p]eople are
buying a preference of a brand, and Americans have been trained to
do that in their consumerism, and there‘s no reason to say they
can‘t do that in their politics.‖96 On the contrary, the marketing of
judges as mere accessories to the whole of a political party is simply
bad for justice.
B. Making Party Identification Work for Judicial Integrity
How can states like Alabama, Texas, and West Virginia be
successful as Illinois was? In Texas, straight ticket voting ensures
Democratic domination in urban centers, and Republican rule on
the state level.
In New York, upstate elections perpetuate
Republican control of judicial seats, and downstate elections
perpetuate Democratic control. Both parties have reasons to favor
keeping a practice that assures particularized and predictable
strongholds, reasons that likely ring stronger in the non-judicial
context. Consequently, reform will likely need to be predicated on
politics proper: legislative and executive elections. The Republicans
in Illinois achieved statewide control with the aid of straight ticket
voting (outside of Chicago).97 But, they lost that control as well
through the same mechanism.98 Illinois Republican leadership
conceded that the move may hamper them along with the

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
95 See Texas Bill Would Outlaw Straight-Ticket Voting, KTRK (HOUS. ABC AFFILIATE),
Dec. 13, 2010, available at http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/story?section=news/politics&id
=7840828. A Texas Republican Party spokesperson countered that they were ―in favor of
giving voters an option, not taking options from voters,‖ while a Democratic Party
spokesperson said ―[i]t‘s critical‖ that the option be preserved as voters ―take pride in voting
the Democratic ticket.‖ Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
96 Batheja, supra note 92 (internal quotation marks omitted).
97 See Kimball & Owens, supra note 86, at 3.
98 See id.
93
94
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Democrats,99 but vowed to rely on the strength of their ―stronger
message‖ and ―better candidates.‖100 Was this a mere ―slap‖ at the
Democrats who had just bested them,101 or were the Republicans
serious about a turn to relying on hard work on the campaign trail
instead of ease at the ballot box?
In reality, do parties even have an identifiable ―brand,‖ one
valuable to voters or consumers, when the campaign message is
reduced to ―one and you‘re done?‖ Arguments about limiting voter
choice demean the ability and political interest of the voters
themselves; the argument in favor of so-called ―choice‖ is really that
the straight ticket option allows the party machinery to capitalize
on voter inattention.
If the straight ticket option were eliminated, Texas Republicans
would undoubtedly still wield control at the state level and Texas
Democrats would still, barring a nationwide shift in the political
mood (as was the case in 2010), generally maintain their success in
the cities. Strongholds would remain strongholds, whether in
Alabama or West Virginia.
An intriguing observation on this point was made by former
United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor, who
since retiring from the high Court has spoken frequently on the
methods used to select state judges. As an Arizona state legislator,
Justice O‘Connor had been involved in the original legislation
establishing merit selection in her home state. ―We didn‘t try to do
it in the rural districts,‖ she has observed, because the legislators in
those districts would have voted against the proposal for urban
districts.102 To this day, only counties with populations greater
than 250,000 employ the merit selection system in Arizona.103 In
the smaller (primarily rural) counties, judges are still elected in
non-partisan elections.104
99 While Democrats undoubtedly benefitted from straight ticket voting in Cook County
(Chicago), Republicans uniformly benefitted from the practice in ―the collar‖ (the counties
surrounding Cook County on Lake Michigan), not to mention more rural areas of the state,
and had ridden the practice to state legislative victories in the past. See Pearson, supra note
85; see also Kimball & Owens, supra note 84, at 2.
100 See Pearson, supra note 85.
101 Id.
102 E-mail from Linda H. Neary, Secretary to Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor (Ret.), to Meryl
Chertoff, Director, The Justice and Society Program, The Aspen Institute, and Adjunct
Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center (Mar. 5, 2012, 9:55 EST) (on file with
author) (confirming Justice O‘Connor‘s consent to release the quote).
103 Mark I. Harrison et al., On the Validity and Vitality of Arizona’s Judicial Merit
Selection System: Past, Present, and Future, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 245 (2007).
104 See
Judicial Selection in the States: Arizona, AM. JUDICATURE SOC‘Y,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=AZ (last visited June 3,
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O‘Connor‘s point underscores the need for reformers to be flexible
and to consider piecemeal reform efforts. If Texas is unwilling to
depart from a straight-ticket system in statewide elections, then
perhaps the departure can be made in urban districts where the
ballots are already longer and more unwieldy.
Success may actually be more likely during Republican-controlled
legislative sessions; traditionally Democratic demographics are the
ones more likely to suffer a slight increase in roll-off following the
elimination of straight ticket voting.105 While there may be some
increase in ticket splitting,106 a party will acquire greater and
lasting strength through the clear articulation of its positions,
rather than by unthinking affiliative behavior. Given the threat to
judicial independence that party domination may facilitate,
removing the straight ticket option is a fairly simple, but highly
symbolic step toward making judicial elections more transparent.
Since legislatures have often proved to be the stumbling block for
reform efforts, we have one final modest suggestion for Texas and
other straight ticket voting states like Alabama and West Virginia.
Their judicial leaders might want to take a look at the IJEQC
system that has been used in New York State, another partisan
election state, since 2007. The elegance of the IJEQC is that it did
not, at least in New York, require legislative approval, but was
established by the judicial branch itself. The political parties can
accept the recommendation of IJEQCs, or they can reject them, but
a rejection certainly provides insurgents and minority party
candidates with a fine talking point for their campaigns. Given
Chief Justice Jefferson‘s firmly articulated support of reform of the
judicial selection process in Texas,107 and particularly his
statements opposing straight-ticket voting, an IJEQC that uses
New York‘s innovations as a template could be a valuable adjunct to
efforts to ‗reform from within‘ the Texas bench—at least until
something better comes along.

2012).
105 Kimball & Owens, supra note 84, at 13. Their study of Illinois elections post-removal of
the option concluded that Republican demographics already are less inclined to roll-off than
Democratic ones. See id. Additionally, though applied to a midterm year, they determined
that elimination of the ―one punch‖ option did not substantially increase roll-off overall. See
id.
106 Id.
107 See generally Jefferson, supra note 5 (explaining that merit matters little in straightticket judicial elections).
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V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the key to finding something better than straight
ticket voting in judicial elections in the states that now allow it will
be a successful lobbying effort, coupled with public education, to
create a true momentum for change. In the meanwhile, piecemeal
reform, and judge-created reform, may ameliorate some of the worst
effects of straight-ticket voting. The greatest evil, however, would
be continued indifference to the straight ticket. At best, the practice
is an abuse of intelligent democracy. At worst, straight ticket
voting corrupts the integrity of a judicial selection system, impairs
judicial independence, and makes the accountability of judges flow
not to the voters, but to party bosses.

